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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Disputes are a basic tenet of the law.  Without disputes there would be no 
need for the courts, no need for judicial decisions.  Whether the conflict is 
between individuals, statutes, or constitutional provisions, the courts must stand 
as referees to render final judgment in the contest presented.  Fresenius USA, Inc. 
v. Baxter International, Inc.1 addresses a controversy involving the conflicting 
interests of Articles I and III of the United States Constitution. 
Fresenius concerns the question of how the jurisdictional restrictions of 
Article III can impact a proceeding involving the Patent Clause of Article I.2  
The holding of Fresenius is heart wrenching.  It is the equivalent of watching a 
brilliantly victorious fencer being stripped of a hard fought championship on 
account of some obscure, seldom-invoked regulation.3 
The decision has had a significant impact in the competitive world of 
patents, an impact which has yet to be fully realized.4  Although the decision is 
not without its critics,5 it is based upon a longstanding technicality of law.  
Because the technicality exists, the rule must be enforced.  But technicalities can 
be changed, and Fresenius emphasizes one such technicality that needs to be 
changed. 
II.  EN GARDE: FRESENIUS USA VS. BAXTER INTERNATIONAL 
The decade-long bout began when Fresenius USA, Inc. and Fresenius 
Medical Care Holdings, Inc. filed for a declaratory judgment against Baxter 
International, Inc. and Baxter Healthcare Corporation alleging that claims 26–
                                                                                                                   
 1 721 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2295 (2014). 
 2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 3 The sport of fencing is replete with obscure rules.  For instance, a combatant may be 
penalized a touch, or point, for failing to shake his opponent’s hand after a bout.  USA FENCING, 
USA FENCING RULES FOR COMPETITION, Rule .87, (2014), available at http://www.usfencing.org/ 
page/show/695208-rulebook (last visited Apr. 17, 2014). 
 4 See ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 760 F.3d 1350, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  The 
district court found Lawson in civil contempt for violating a previously issued injunction.  
Lawson appealed both the injunction and contempt order.  During the pendency of Lawson’s 
appeals, the United States Patent and Trademark Office completed a reexamination of the patent 
in question and determined that the claim in dispute was invalid.  In a separate appeal, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the invalidity determination and the cancellation of the disputed claim.  The 
Federal Circuit, relying on Fresenius, vacated the injunction and contempt order because both were 
based on a claim which had been cancelled. 
 5 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1347–65 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also ePlus, Inc., 760 F.3d at 1361–
69 (O’Malley, J., dissenting). 
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31 of U.S. Patent No. 5,247,434 (’434 patent) were invalid and not infringed.6  
Baxter counterattacked by suing Fresenius for infringement.7 
Baxter was the owner of the ’434 patent, which involved a hemodialysis 
machine.8  Hemodialysis machines are used in the place of kidneys to cleanse 
the blood of toxins.9  When a person’s blood is pumped through the machine, 
toxins pass from the blood into a solution called dialysate.10  The relevant 
claims of the ’434 patent teach the use of a dialysis machine with an integrated 
touch screen interface.11 
In 2003, Fresenius, a manufacturer of hemodialysis machines, filed suit in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of California seeking 
declaratory judgments of invalidity and non-infringement with respect to three 
Baxter patents, including claims 26–31 of the ’434 patent, as well as claims 
involving U.S. Patent No. 5,744,027 (’027 patent) and U.S. Patent No. 6,284,131 
(’131 patent).12  In riposte,13 Baxter counterclaimed for infringement.14  Fresenius 
actually stipulated to the infringement of the ’434 patent’s claims, but argued that 
the claims were invalid.15  A jury returned a verdict in Fresenius’s favor, finding 
the relevant claims of the ’434 patent invalid and that certain claims of the ’027 
and ’131 patents invalid.16 
Fresenius’s early touch was quickly met and surpassed as the district court 
granted Baxter’s motion for judgment as a matter of law finding insufficient 
evidence to prove that the patents’ claims were invalid.17  A jury trial on 
damages was then conducted, and the jury awarded Baxter $14.266 million for 
infringement on the three patents.18  The district court then entered a 
                                                                                                                   
 6 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1331. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 1332. 
 9 See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 10 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1332. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. C03–1431, 2007 WL 518804, at 
*1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2007).  The original complaint included two additional Baxter patents, U.S. 
Patent No. 5,326,476 (’476 patent) and U.S. Patent No. 5,486,286 (’286 patent).  The district court 
dismissed all claims concerning the ’286 patent in 2006, while Baxter dismissed the ’476 patent 
claims from the suit prior to the damages trial.  Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1332 n.1. 
 13 A riposte is an attack immediately following the parry of an opponent’s attack.  Glossary of 
Terms, SYNEC-DOC.BE, http://www.synec-doc.be/escrime/dico/engl.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 
2015). 
 14 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1332. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 1332–33. 
 18 Id. at 1333. 
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permanent injunction, which was stayed, and bestowed upon Baxter ongoing 
post-verdict royalties on infringing machines and related disposables sold by 
Fresenius.19  Both parties, not surprisingly, appealed.20 
On September 10, 2009, the Federal Circuit reversed in part, affirmed in 
part, vacated in part, and remanded the case to the district court.21  The Federal 
Circuit held that the asserted claims of the ’027 and ’131 patents were invalid, 
reversing the district court’s decision blessing Baxter’s motion for a judgment as 
a matter of law.22  The court, however, did find that Fresenius had failed to 
present sufficient evidence that the claims of the ’434 patent at issue were 
obvious.23  These claims required a “means for delivering the dialysate to a 
dialysate compartment of a hemodialyzer.”24  The court stated that Fresenius 
had “failed to present any evidence . . . that the structure corresponding to the 
means for delivering dialysate limitation, or an equivalent thereof, existed in the 
prior art.”25  The Federal Circuit further decreed that because Fresenius had 
failed to present any evidence that the structure in question existed in the prior 
art, a judgment as a matter of law was appropriate.26 
Thus the court affirmed the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of 
law regarding the ’434 patent claims, reversed the district court regarding the 
other two patents, and vacated the district court’s injunction and royalty 
awards.27  The Federal Circuit directed on remand that the district court revise 
or reconsider its injunction in light of the court’s reversal regarding the ’027 and 
’131 patents.28  The district court was also “to consider whether the previous 
[royalty] award [wa]s proper in light of [the Federal Circuit’s] modification of 
the district court’s judgment.”29  The Federal Circuit noted that, “[i]n 
particular, . . . our decision . . . may [have] affect[ed] how the district court 
weighs [the relevant] factors” in determining the royalty award.30 
On remand, Baxter lunged for “a final decision on the permanent injunction 
and ongoing royalties.”31  Fresenius parried, asserting that it was no longer 
                                                                                                                   
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Fresenius, 582 F.3d at 1291. 
 22 Id. at 1297. 
 23 Id. at 1296. 
 24 Id. at 1293. 
 25 Id. at 1299. 
 26 Id. at 1300. 
 27 Id. at 1304.  
 28 Id. at 1303.  
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Fresenius, 723 F.3d at 1333. 
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selling the infringing machines, rendering the injunction unnecessary, and that 
the ordered royalties were unreasonable.  Fresenius also sought to retry the pre-
verdict damages on the ’434 patent.32  On May 26, 2011, the district court 
denied Fresenius’s motion for a new trial on the question of pre-verdict 
damages.33  In December 2011, the district court then held an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue of post-verdict royalties.34  By this time, the permanent 
injunction had become moot as the ’434 patent had expired in April 2011.35 
On March 8, 2012, the district court awarded Baxter post-verdict damages, 
but at a reduced royalty rate.36  On March 16, 2012, the district court entered its 
final judgment for Baxter.37  Fresenius was ordered to pay Baxter over $23 
million in damages and interest, in addition to royalties, for units sold prior to 
the expiration of the ’434 patent. 
Naturally, Fresenius appealed.38  Baxter countered, cross-appealing the 
district court’s reduction of the post-verdict royalties.39  On May 3, 2012, the 
district court granted Fresenius’s motion to stay the execution of the new 
judgment pending appeal.40  In granting the stay, the district court rejected the 
argument that Baxter was entitled to enforce and execute the 2007 judgment.41  
The district court explained that “the March 16, 2012 final judgment appears to 
supercede [sic] the Nov. 7, 2007 final judgment.”42 
In the meantime, while the parties were thrusting accusations back and forth 
in the third branch of government, Fresenius performed a brilliant attaque au 
fer.43  In 2005, Fresenius requested an ex parte reexamination with the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) of claims 26–31 of the ’434 patent, 
the only claims which were ultimately remaining in the pending infringement 
litigation.44  In January 2006, the PTO agreed that a substantial new question of 
                                                                                                                   
 32 Id. 
 33 See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. 03–1431, 2011 WL 2160609 (N.D. Cal. May 
26, 2011).  
 34 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1333. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. 03–1431, 2012 WL 761712, at *14–16 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 8, 2012).  
 37 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1334. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 An attaque au fer is an attack on the opponent’s blade.  Glossary of Terms, SYNEC-DOC.BE, 
http://www.synec-doc.be/escrime/dico/engl.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
 44 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1334; In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012), reh’g 
en banc denied, 698 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
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patentability had been raised in light of new prior art, and granted the request 
for a reexamination.45 
The PTO’s reexamination proceeded on a parallel track with the district 
court litigation.46  In December 2006, less than a year before the damages trial, 
the PTO examiner raised the yellow card47 after reaching an initial 
determination that the claims would have been obvious.48  A year later, in 
December 2007, the red card49 went up as the PTO examiner reached a final 
determination rejecting claims 26–31 of the ’434 patent.50  The examiner 
concluded that all structures required by claim 26, including the “means for 
delivering the dialysate,” were present in the prior art, and that the claim would 
have been obvious.51  The examiner also determined that claim 30 would have 
been obvious over a combination of references which were not before the PTO 
during the initial examination.52  Thus, the patent examiner found new, 
invalidating prior art that had not been raised in the initial examination or in the 
prior district court proceedings.53 
In March 2010, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences upheld the 
examiner’s determination that the relevant claims would have been obvious in 
light of the prior art that had been overlooked in the initial examination.54  
Baxter contested the examiner’s analysis of the prior art.55  The Board noted, 
however, that Baxter never argued in the reexamination proceeding that one 
particular reference failed to teach the “means for delivering the dialysate” 
required by claim 26, nor that an additional reference failed to teach claim 30’s 
“means for delivering an anticoagulant.”56  This, despite the fact that these were 
                                                                                                                   
 45 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1334. 
 46 Id. 
 47 In fencing, the yellow card indicates a minor rule infraction.  Glossary of Terms, SYNEC-
DOC.BE, http://www.synec-doc.be/escrime/dico/engl.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
 48 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1334. 
 49 The red card indicates a more serious rule infraction and results in either the loss of a touch 
or a point being awarded to the other fencer.  Glossary of Terms, SYNEC-DOC.BE, http://www.syne 
c-doc.be/escrime/dico/engl.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).  See also MAXWELL R. GARRET ET 
AL., FOIL, SABER, AND ÉPÉÉ FENCING 152 (1994). 
 50 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1334. 
 51 Ex parte Baxter, No. 2009–006493, 2010 WL 1048980, at *5–6, *8–9, *14 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 18, 
2010). 
 52 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1334; Ex parte Baxter, 2010 WL 1048980, at *15, *17.  
 53 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1334; In re Baxter, 678 F.3d at 1365. 
 54 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1335. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. (citations omitted). 
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the very elements of the claims that Baxter had successfully argued, were 
missing from the prior art in the district court proceedings.57 
After the Board denied rehearing, Baxter appealed to the Federal Circuit.58  
The court raised the black card,59 affirming the PTO’s determination that the 
rejected claims would have been obvious from the prior art.60  The court 
explained the determination was not inconsistent with the court’s holding in the 
infringement litigation because the examiner had “sufficiently identified the 
corresponding structure recited in [claim 26 of] the ’434 patent” and could 
“identif[y] the structures in the prior art” that would have rendered the asserted 
claims unpatentable.61  Moreover, the examiner had “based [the] rejections on 
prior art references that were not squarely at issue during the trial on the 
invalidity issues.”62  The Federal Circuit denied rehearing en banc,63 issuing its 
mandate on November 2, 2012.64  Baxter did not file a petition for certiorari 
with the Supreme Court of the United States.65  Fresenius’s prise de fer66 was 
complete when the PTO issued a certificate cancelling claims 26–31 of the ’434 
patent.67 
During various periods in the judicial infringement proceedings, the district 
court declined to stay the case pending the PTO reexamination.68  In June 2007, 
the district court recognized the potential impact the PTO proceedings would 
have on the infringement suit.69  The court acknowledged that the PTO had 
“already made initial, non-final determinations that the subject claims in the 
patents-in-suit are invalid,” and that “if all the claims are invalidated, as the 
PTO’s initial non-final determinations might imply, there will be no issues to 
                                                                                                                   
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 The black card indicates the most serious offenses in a fencing competition.  The offending 
fencer is usually expelled from the event or tournament.  Glossary of Terms, SYNEC-DOC.BE, http:// 
www.synec-doc.be/escrime/dico/engl.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).  See also MAXWELL R. 
GARRET ET AL., FOIL, SABER, AND ÉPÉÉ FENCING 152 (1994). 
 60 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1335; In re Baxter, 678 F.3d at 1366.  
 61 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1335 (quoting In re Baxter, 678 F.3d at 1364–65). 
 62 Id. (quoting In re Baxter, 678 F.3d at 1365). 
 63 In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 698 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 64 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1335. 
 65 Id. 
 66 A prise de fer, literally “taking the blade,” is an attack in which the fencer attempts to control 
the opponent’s weapon.  Glossary of Terms, SYNEC-DOC.BE, http://www.synec-doc.be/escrime/ 
dico/engl.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2015). 
 67 See Ex parte Reexamination Certificate, U.S. Pat. No. 5,247,434 C1 (P.T.O. Apr. 30, 2013). 
 68 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1335. 
 69 Id. 
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try.”70  The court concluded that “it is also possible that the PTO’s [initial] 
determination will have no ultimate bearing on the damages determination in 
this case, as the PTO’s initial actions were non-final and non-binding, and the 
PTO is free to reconsider its initial determinations.”71  The district court denied 
the stay due to the possibility that the examiner’s determination could change.72  
The district court again declined to issue a stay for similar reasons in 2011.73 
On March 16, 2012, while the appeal of the PTO’s reexamination decision 
was pending before the Federal Circuit, the district court entered judgment for 
Baxter.74  On May 17, 2012, the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTO’s rejection of 
the ’434 patent’s claims.75   
In the latest Fresenius case, the court addressed the issue of whether, under 
the reexamination statute, the cancelling of claims is binding in a pending 
infringement case.76  The Federal Circuit ruled that it was, and thereby stripped 
Baxter International of its multi-million dollar verdict.77 
III.  THE RULE BOOK 
As with anything in life, one must know the rules.  Although some legal 
doctrines may be more difficult to follow than an eighteenth century 
encyclopedia of chivalrous swordplay, the rules of any game must be followed.  
It is by understanding the rules that success is achieved.  To understand the 
reissue authority of the PTO, the history and scope of that power must be 
studied.  This understanding is important because the reexamination statute 
provides that reexamined claims “have the same effect as that specified in 
section 252 for reissued patents . . . .”78 
The year was 1832 and Congress had codified the Supreme Court’s decision 
that even in the absence of a statutory provision authorizing reissue, where an 
innocent mistake had been made in granting a patent,79 “[a]ll would admit that a 
new patent, correcting the error, . . . ought to be issued.”80  In the course of the 
                                                                                                                   
 70 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 71 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. (citing Fresenius, 2011 WL 2160609, at *1 (“[T]he effect on this litigation of any final 
action on the reexamined ‘434 patent is far from clear.”)). 
 74 Id. at 1336.  
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 1347. 
 78 35 U.S.C. § 307(b) (2012). 
 79 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1336. 
 80 Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 242 (1832). 
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reissue proceeding, “the patent office [is] authorized to deal with all [the 
patent’s] claims . . . and might declare them to be invalid.”81  The first version 
of the reissue statute provided that an original patent was surrendered and 
canceled upon application for reissue.82  Thus, upon surrender, the original 
patent became inoperative.  The patentee would then proceed to protect his 
rights under the reissued patent.83 
The statute was revised in 1870 to provide that the surrender and 
cancellation took place upon completion of the reissue proceeding.84  Prior to 
1928, reissuance of a patent extinguished all pending claims based on that 
patent because the original patent was considered canceled.85  The Supreme 
Court decisions construing the reissue statute “uniformly held that if a reissue is 
granted, the patentee has no rights except such as grow out of the reissued 
patent.  He has none under the original.  That is extinguished.”86  Furthermore, 
when a claim was canceled pursuant to a reissue, pending litigation based upon 
that claim ceased.87  As the Supreme Court explained in Moffitt v. Garr: 
[I]n case of a surrender and reissue, . . . the pending suits fall with 
the surrender.  A surrender of the patent to the Commissioner 
within the sense of the provision, means an act which, in 
judgment of law, extinguishes the patent.  It is a legal cancellation 
of it, and hence can no more be the foundation for the assertion 
of a right after the surrender, than could an act of Congress 
which has been repealed.  It has frequently been determined that 
suits pending, which rest upon an act of Congress, fall with the 
repeal of it.  The reissue of the patent has no connection with or 
bearing upon antecedent suits; it has as to subsequent suits.  The 
antecedent suits depend upon the patent existing at the time they 
were commenced, and unless it exists, and is in force at the time 
of trial and judgment, the suits fail.88 
                                                                                                                   
 81 McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. C. Aultman & Co., 169 U.S. 606, 612 (1898). 
 82 See generally id. at 609–11 (where the Court examines its prior decisions and discusses the 
process and setting aside and reissuing a patent.. 
 83 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1336. 
 84 See McCormick Harvesting, 169 U.S. at 610–12 (holding that if a reissue application is rejected 
or abandoned, the original claims are not extinguished). 
 85 See II ANTHONY W. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS § 319 (1937); see also Fresenius, 721 F.3d 
at 1336. 
 86 Peck v. Collins, 103 U.S. 660, 664 (1880). 
 87 Moffitt v. Garr, 66 U.S. 273, 283 (1861). 
 88 Id. 
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The Supreme Court repeatedly applied Moffitt after the 1870 statutory 
amendment.89  In Meyer v. Pritchard,90 the Supreme Court held that the 
cancellation of a patent mooted the appeal: 
Since the appeal in this case, the appellants . . . have surrendered 
the patent upon which the suit was brought . . . .  If we should 
hear the case and reverse the decree below, we could not decree 
affirmative relief to the appellants . . . because the patent upon 
which their rights depend has been canceled.  There is no longer 
any real or substantial controversy between those who appear as 
parties to the suit upon the issues which have been joined, and 
for that reason the appeal is dismissed . . . .91 
In 1928, Congress created an exception to the rule that “all rights [a 
patentee] had in and under the original patent are forfeited ab initio upon the 
grant of the reissue.”92  Congress amended the reissue statute, authorizing 
continuance of actions for infringement of the original claims after reissue, but 
only “to the extent that [the reissued patent’s] claims are identical with the 
original patent.”93  The Senate Report on the 1928 amendment explained that 
the change was meant “simply to correct an almost unbelievable and inequitable 
situation.  Under the present law if a patentee applies for a reissue, no matter 
for what purpose, all rights he had in and under the original patent are forfeited 
ab initio upon the grant of the reissue.”94  
As a result of this amendment, the reissue statute now provides that: 
[E]very reissued patent shall have the same effect and operation 
in law, on the trial of actions for causes thereafter arising, as if the 
same had been originally granted in such amended form, but in 
so far as the claims of the original and reissued patents are 
substantially identical, such surrender shall not affect any action 
then pending nor abate any cause of action then existing, and the 
                                                                                                                   
 89 See Allen v. Culp, 166 U.S. 501, 505 (1897) (holding that the original patent “becomes 
inoperative” on reissue); Reedy v. Scott, 90 U.S. 352, 364 (1874) (“[T]he effect of the surrender is 
to extinguish the patent, and hence it can no more be the foundation for the assertion of a right 
than can a legislative act which has been repealed without any saving clause of pending actions.”). 
 90 131 U.S. App’x CCIX (1877). 
 91 Id. 
 92 S. REP. NO. 70-567, at 1 (1928). 
 93 See Pub. L. No. 501, 45 Stat. 732, 732 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 64 (1928)). 
 94 S. REP. NO. 70-567, at 1; see also H.R. REP. NO. 70-1435, at 1–2 (1928) (similar). 
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reissued patent, to the extent that its claims are substantially 
identical with the original patent, shall constitute a continuation 
thereof and have effect continuously from the date of the original 
patent.95 
While  
prior to 1928 one could not recover for past infringement of a 
reissued patent even if the claims were unchanged . . . the 1928 
amendment expressly overruled this interpretation, and 
authorized the reissue of patents to correct errors while enabling 
recovery for past infringement of claims ‘identical’ to those in the 
original patent.96 
The amendment, however, did not change the rule that suits based on 
cancelled claims require dismissal.97  When the patent is reissued, the original 
claims that are not reissued in identical form become unenforceable.98  Thus, 
the surrender of the original patent will not block any pending litigation or 
terminate any cause of action to the “extent, but only to the extent, that the 
claims of the original and reissue patents are identical.”99 
The PTO “had no power to revoke, cancel, or annul” a previously issued 
patent under the reissue statute unless a reissue proceeding had been initiated 
by the patentee.100  In 1980, Congress changed the rules, authorizing ex parte 
reexaminations to address deficiencies in the reissue statute.101  The ex parte 
reexamination, like a reissuance, is a proceeding meant to correct or eliminate 
erroneously granted patents.102  The reexamination statute authorized the PTO 
                                                                                                                   
 95 35 U.S.C. § 252 (1999). 
 96 Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 810 F.2d 1113, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citations 
omitted). 
 97 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1338.  
 98 See Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 807 F.2d 970, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“[T]he patentee has no 
rights [in a non-identical claim] to enforce before the date of reissue because the original patent 
was surrendered and is dead.”); Seattle Box Co. v. Indus. Crating & Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 
827 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The statute does not allow the claims of the original patent some other 
form of survival.  The original claims are dead.”). 
 99 4A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 15.05 (2013). 
 100 McCormick Harvesting, 169 U.S. at 612; see also Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 601 
(Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 101 See Patent Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 
U.S.C. §§ 301–307). 
 102 See In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 858 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1468 
(Fed. Cir. 1994). 
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to reconsider patents of “doubtful” validity and to cancel “defectively examined 
and therefore erroneously granted patent[s].”103 
When a claim is determined to be invalid on reexamination, the Director of 
the PTO is required to cancel the claim.104  The statute specifically declares: 
In a reexamination proceeding under this chapter, when the time 
for appeal has expired or any appeal proceeding has terminated, 
the Director will issue and publish a certificate canceling any 
claim of the patent finally determined to be unpatentable, 
confirming any claim of the patent determined to be patentable, 
and incorporating in the patent any proposed amended or new 
claim determined to be patentable.105 
“Even if the claim is amended during reexamination to render the claim 
valid, no suit can be maintained for the period prior to the validating 
amendment.”106  “To ensure that a person practicing a patented invention 
would not be considered an infringer for the period between issuance of an 
invalid patent and its conversion through reexamination to a valid patent,”107 
Congress limited the enforcement of reissued claims to reexamined claims.108  
Specifically: 
Any proposed amended or new claim determined to be 
patentable and incorporated into a patent following a 
reexamination proceeding will have the same effect as that 
specified in section 252 [35 U.S.C. § 252] for reissued patents on 
the right of any person who [infringed] anything patented by such 
proposed amended or new claim, . . . prior to issuance of a 
[reexamination] certificate.109 
                                                                                                                   
 103 Patlex, 758 F.2d at 602, 604; see also In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(describing “Congress’ purpose of allowing for a reexamination procedure to correct examiner 
errors”). 
 104 35 U.S.C. § 307(a) (2012). 
 105 Id.; see also id. § 306 (providing patentees with appeal rights from any PTO reexamination 
“decision adverse to the patentability” of one or more claims). 
 106 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1339. 
 107 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, at 8 (1980). 
 108 Id. 
 109 35 U.S.C. § 307(b) (2012). 
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The Federal Circuit has explained that the reexamination statute restricts a 
patentee’s ability to enforce the patent’s original claims to those claims that 
survive reexamination in “identical” form.110 
The Federal Circuit has concluded that the cancellation of claims during 
reexamination would preclude maintenance of a stayed interference suit 
involving the same claims.111  The court explained: 
[T]he reexamination, if carried to completion, is likely to result in 
the cancellation of all of the claims of [the] patent [over the 
interfering patent].  That in turn will require a dismissal of the 
interfering patents suit, since a necessary condition for such an action 
is the existence of two valid and interfering patents.112 
Similarly, in a stayed infringement proceeding, “if the claims were canceled 
in the reexamination, [it] would eliminate the need to try the infringement 
issue.”113  In either situation, “a necessary condition for such an action is the 
existence of [a] valid . . . patent[ ].”114  The effect of the cancellation of a patent 
pursuant to the statute, according to the Federal Circuit, is “no insult 
to . . . Article III.”115  Of course, the last thing anyone would want to do is to 
insult Article III—insulting Article I is apparently another matter.  Thus, “under 
either the reissue or reexamination statute, if the PTO confirms the original 
claim in identical form, a suit based on that claim may continue, but if the 
original claim is cancelled or amended to cure invalidity, the patentee’s cause of 
action is extinguished and the suit fails.”116 
                                                                                                                   
 110 See, e.g., Bloom Eng’g Co. v. N. Am. Mfg. Co., 129 F.3d 1247, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Unless 
a claim granted or confirmed upon reexamination is identical to an original claim, the patent can 
not be enforced against infringing activity that occurred before issuance of the reexamination 
certificate.”); see, e.g., Tennant Co. v. Hako Minuteman, Inc., 878 F.2d 1413, 1417 (Fed. Cir. 1989); 
Fortel Corp. v. Phone–Mate, Inc., 825 F.2d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 111 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1339–40; Slip Track Sys., Inc. v. Metal Lite, Inc., 159 F.3d 1337, 1340 
(Fed. Cir. 1998).  
 112 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1340 (emphasis in original) (quoting Slip Track Sys., 159 F.3d at 1340). 
 113 Slip Track Sys., 159 F.3d at 1341. 
 114 Id. at 1340; see also Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 705 F.2d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
(noting that “[o]ne purpose of the reexamination procedure is to eliminate trial of that issue 
(when the claim is canceled)”). 
 115 See Patlex, 758 F.2d at 604. 
 116 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1340. 
13
Kalkwarf: Stop in the Name of the PTO! A Review of the Fresenius Saga and P
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2015
328 J. INTELL. PROP. L.  [Vol. 22:315 
 
 
IV.  TIME TO REVISE THE RULES 
Congress is entrusted under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution 
to promote invention and innovation.117  As part of this duty, Congress has the 
responsibility of establishing the rules and regulations it feels are necessary to 
“promote the Progress of [the] . . . useful Arts.”118  Although the Supreme 
Court has noted that Congress lacks carte blanche authority regarding patents 
due to certain constitutional restrictions,119 a modification of the 
aforementioned rule book needs to be developed and implemented to avoid the 
senseless waste of time, money, and judicial resources as was seen in the 
Fresenius cases. 
Although the Federal Circuit insists that Congress wants reexaminations to 
occur concurrent with any pending litigation,120 this rule must end.  It must 
cease for the benefit of the parties, for the benefit of the judiciary, and for the 
benefit of the American economy. 
Patent infringement litigation is so expensive that the cost involved can 
destroy a company.121  Patent infringement suits have been estimated to involve 
costs ranging from several hundred thousand dollars to tens of millions of 
dollars.122  Millions of dollars wasted that could be more productively used in 
research and development, plant expansions, and job creation. 
The founding fathers charged Congress in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 to 
encourage discovery and innovation by allowing for the creation of limited 
monopolies to reward innovation and economic growth.123  Ceaseless litigation 
does not comply with this constitutional decree, it contradicts it. 
                                                                                                                   
 117 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 states:  “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”   
 118 Id. 
 119 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).  Patents cannot be 
perpetual and may not remove exiting knowledge from the public domain, nor may patents 
prohibit or restrict access to materials which are already available to the public.  Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 210 (2003); Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146; Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 
U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966). 
 120 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1339 & n.7. 
 121 Joel T. Beres & Melissa Hunter Smith, The Supreme Court Redefines “Exceptionality” and Lowers 
Bar for Recovery of Attorney Fees in Patent Suits, BUS. L. TODAY 1, 1 (June 2014). 
 122 John M. Golden, Litigation in the Middle: The Context of Patent-Infringement Injunctions, 92 TEX. L. 
REV. 2075, 2091 (2014). 
 123 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 151; Graham, 383 U.S. at 5–9. 
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V.  CONGRESSIONAL HISTORY SHOULD REPEAT ITSELF 
Before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was 
created under the Federal Courts Improvements Act of 1982,124 district court 
judgments in patent cases were appealed to the applicable regional circuit courts 
of appeals.125  Because multiple regional circuits were involved, variances in 
patent jurisprudence existed.126  Due to this diversity, the statute’s objective in 
establishing the Federal Circuit was to create “a specialized appellate court for 
patent cases [to increase] ‘doctrinal stability in the field of patent law.’ ”127  
Thus, Congress created the Federal Circuit as the single appellate court for 
patents to ensure a “more stable and predictable” forum for patent issues.128 
Unlike the regional circuits, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is limited to 
specific subjects with national scope.129  The Federal Circuit’s conception can 
be traced to proposals made by the Hruska Commission in studying the 
caseload problems that were being experienced by the federal courts.130  It was 
during the work on this study that the problems involving patent litigation were 
brought to the attention of Congress.131 
The Patent and Trademark Office was responsible for the initial 
determinations of patentability.132  Although the Patent and Trademark Office 
was allowed to create its own theories concerning patentability, those theories, 
along with the decisions of its reviewing court, the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals, did not bind other federal courts.133  Because the regional 
circuits eroded a patent’s presumption of validity by utterly failing to attempt to 
create uniformity in patent law,134 the economic value of patents declined.135  
                                                                                                                   
 124 Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). 
 125 Lynda J. Oswald, Simplifying Multiactor Patent Infringement Cases Through Proper Application of 
Common Law Doctrine, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 6 (2014). 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 7; S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15; see also H.R. 
REP. NO. 97-312, at 16–27 (1981) (presenting “the purpose, background, and need for the 
legislation”).  
 128 S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 16; H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 23. 
 129 Oswald, supra note 125, at 7; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012). 
 130 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1, 6 (1989).  The Commission was named in recognition of its chair, Senator Roman Hruska 
of Nebraska.  Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 11, 23.  The report may 
be found at Comm’n on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys., Structure & Internal Procedures: 
Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975). 
 131 Dreyfuss, supra note 130, at 6. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 6. 
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The irresponsibility of the circuits to achieve patent harmony resulted in a 
stifling of the useful arts, suffocating business incentives to invest in research 
and development.136 
The Federal Circuit’s duty was to create order from chaos.137  The single 
appellate forum, like the single litigation forum proposal in this article, was 
designed to eliminate the wasteful litigation of the past through uniform 
jurisprudence.138  The single court concept was to promote technology and 
innovation.139 
VI.  UNITING FOR THE COMMON GOOD 
This is no longer the 1980s, and the two front strategy in challenging the 
validity of a patent needs to go the way of the polyester pantsuit.  Congress 
needs to examine the problem illustrated by the Fresenius cases.  Allowing such a 
strategy is destructive to all involved—history proves this point.  Whether it was 
the Napoleonic Wars or either of the World Wars, when a country is forced to 
do battle on two or more fronts, collapse due to a lack of resources is 
inevitable. 
The same is true in a patent litigation proceeding.  To characterize patent 
litigation as anything less than costly economic combat is to view such bouts in 
a fantasy land.  Under the current available procedures, a party challenging the 
validity of a patent may attack the patent administratively in the PTO and 
judicially in the courts.140  Just as in a two-front war, which history has proven 
to be so devastating, a patent holder may be forced to defend the patent in both 
costly forums. 
This is not to say that an invalid patent should be protected.  To the 
contrary, if a patent is invalid, its knowledge, however valuable, belongs to the 
citizenry.141  What Congress needs to do is to restrict patent challenges to one 
front at a time. 
The Fresenius Saga represents the idol god of two-front waste.  Fresenius’s 
legal front began in 2003 in the Northern District of California.142  Two years 
later, Fresenius filed its request for the ex parte examination with the PTO 
                                                                                                                   
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 7. 
 137 Dreyfuss, supra note 130, at 7. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1331–32, 1334–35, 1339–40. 
 141 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 152. 
 142 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1332. 
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regarding the contested claims in the ’434 patent.143  Months later, the PTO 
agreed a substantial question of patentability had been raised due to new prior 
art, thereby granting the reexamination request.144 
By January 2006, the parties and the district court were on notice that the 
PTO was concerned that the claims in question did not meet the requirements 
of patentability.  In December, the PTO made the initial determination that the 
claims were obvious,145 with the final determination rejecting the claims 
occurring a year later.146  Thus, in December 2007, just four years after the 
initial filing of the lawsuit, the PTO had determined that the claims were invalid.  
The parties continued to litigate the patent by appealing the PTO’s December 
2007 decision administratively through the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences147 to the Federal Circuit, which ultimately upheld the rejection of 
the claims.148 
Despite the initial warning by the PTO in January 2006, with a final 
determination rejecting the claims in December 2007, the parties proceeded to 
waste six years and a fortune in litigation costs just to reaffirm a 2007 decision 
by the PTO that had been repeatedly upheld on appeal. 
VII.  THE NEW RULE 
The solution to this chaotic litigation Ferris wheel is for Congress to grant 
the PTO the authority to order a stay of any federal court proceeding until the 
PTO resolves a reexamination proceeding which may be pending during a 
litigation action.  The idea is not without precedent. 
Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), Congress directed automatic stays be imposed 
upon judicial proceedings when a debtor files for bankruptcy.149  This same 
                                                                                                                   
 143 Id. at 1334; In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d at 1360. 
 144 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1334. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. at 1335. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1): 
(a)  Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under 
section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) 
of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, operates as a stay, applicable 
to all entities, of – 
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment 
of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the 
debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of 
the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose 
before the commencement of the case under this title; 
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principle may be applied when a reexamination has been filed with the PTO.  
This proposal, however, presents four separate scenarios that must be analyzed 
before the appropriate solution is chosen.  As with all plans, each have their 
benefits and drawbacks. 
A.  THE SPARK 
The spark focuses on the earliest moment when a stay can be issued.  This 
would be the instant when an ex parte reexamination is filed with the PTO.  
The advantage with providing an immediate stay at this time is that all litigation 
is halted at the earliest possible moment.  The parties are no longer focused on 
the expense of litigation and may wait until the PTO decides the question 
regarding the validity of the claims or patent in question.   
The biggest problem with this proposal?  Abuse.  The proposal, although 
the most attractive with regards to conserving costs related to litigation, is the 
one most open to abuse by the litigants.  This procedure would be a legislative 
beatification of the litigation mantra: Delay, Delay, Delay.150 
When a defendant is sued for a patent infringement, the entity can 
immediately halt the litigation proceeding by requesting a reexamination.  
Whether the reexamination has merit or not, the alleged infringer can 
unnecessarily delay the litigation process while still continuing to infringe upon 
the patent.  Appropriately harsh sanctions for meritless reexamination requests 
may prove necessary to curtail this abuse. 
B.  THE SMOKE 
The second opportunity to stay any judicial proceeding would be at the 
moment a PTO examiner believes that a substantial question of patentability 
has been raised and the request for reexamination is granted, as what happened 
in Fresenius.151  This moves the needle of credibility regarding the reexamination 
request further towards the range of legitimacy.  Unlike the first option, where 
the alleged infringer can halt the judicial proceedings simply by filing a 
reexamination request regardless of merit, requiring a stay once the PTO has 
made an initial review of the request prevents frivolous reexamination requests 
from blocking legitimate legal proceedings. 
                                                                                                                   
 150 Lou Chang, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act and Its Impact Upon the Collective Bargaining 
Arbitration Process, 18 HI. B.J. 4, 14 (2014). 
 151 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1334. 
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To obtain such a grant requires the showing of “a substantial new question 
of patentability affecting any claim of a patent.”152  Further, the PTO examiner 
must make a determination on whether to grant the request within three 
months of the filing date of the ex parte reexamination request.153  Thus, the 
PTO’s initial decision on the motion is made very quickly after the motion is 
filed.  Further, “a substantial new question of patentability” is not an 
insignificant standard to satisfy.154 
The problem with this benchmark is that it is still relatively early in the 
reexamination process.  More importantly, the patent holder is not allowed to 
respond to the reexamination request prior to the reexamination 
determination.155  Any response to the reexamination request that may be filed 
by the patent owner will not be acknowledged or considered in the 
reexamination determination.156  In fact, any such statement will be returned or 
discarded at the PTO’s option.157  Thus, given that the patent holder has not 
had the opportunity to file a response, it would seem unfair, from a due process 
perspective, to issue the stay at this point of the administrative process.  It is the 
equivalent of evaluating a book after reading the first chapter.  The first chapter 
should pique your interest, but it does not tell you the whole story.  Further, 
more in-depth research by the PTO in granting the motion may lead to an 
ultimate finding that the claims were valid and the grant of the reexamination 
request was for naught.  Thus, the issuance of the stay when the reexamination 
is granted could needlessly delay court litigation. 
C.  FIRE 
The next logical benchmark at which the PTO could issue the stay is when 
an examiner has reached an initial determination.158  At this point, the PTO has 
had the opportunity to address the concerns raised in the reexamination request 
and engage in the necessary research. 
Although this benchmark may not be the earliest possible option in issuing a 
stay, it does occur relatively early in the overall litigation landscape.  Placed in 
perspective under the facts of Fresenius, it took less than one year between when 
                                                                                                                   
 152 35 U.S.C. § 304; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.510(b)(1). 
 153 37 C.F.R. § 1.515(a). 
 154 THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURES § 2242 (9th ed. 2014), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep// 
s2242.html. 
 155 37 C.F.R. § 1.530(a). 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 See Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1334. 
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the PTO granted the request for the reexamination and the initial 
determination, and less than two years from when the ex parte reexamination 
was filed.159 
The detriment of issuing the stay at this point is that the PTO’s final 
determination could be the opposite of the initial determination.160  Practically 
speaking, given the amount of money at stake, the delay in this option, although 
potentially unnecessary, imposes only a slight burden in the overall litigation 
process.  Using the facts of Fresenius as an example, only a year passed between 
the initial determination by the PTO examiner and the examiner’s final 
determination.161  Given that the Federal Circuit issued its final Fresenius 
decision ten years after the filing of the complaint162 and six years after the 
PTO’s final determination,163 a mere one-year delay to save millions of dollars 
in expenses is an extremely tenable economic compromise. 
D.  FOUR ALARM FIRE 
The fourth benchmark would be when the PTO issues its final 
determination regarding the reexamination request.  The advantage of delaying 
the stay until this moment would be to ensure that the PTO had finally 
determined the validity of the patent in question, in the agency’s opinion.  The 
disadvantage is that it allows the parallel litigation to proceed for a considerable 
time.  If the PTO concludes that the patent is still valid, no harm is done and 
the court proceedings are not delayed or unnecessarily impeded.  In contrast, if 
the final determination is one of invalidity, then the parties and court may have 
expended needless resources during the agency’s review process on an invalid 
patent. 
In Fresenius, the final decision was issued in December 2007, two years after 
the ex parte request, one year after the initial determination, but four years after 
the litigation was initiated.164  Although arguably not long after the 
reexamination request was made, years of litigation had still been needlessly 
expended on invalid claims. 
                                                                                                                   
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. at 1335 (This is the reason why the district court in Fresenius refused to issue a stay.).  
 161 Id. at 1334. 
 162 Id. at 1332. 
 163 Id. at 1330, 1332.  
 164 Id. at 1333–34 
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E.  APPEASING ACADEMIA   
To appease the egos of academia and their relentless criticisms, there are 
other benchmarks at which a stay may be issued.  The first is when a party 
appeals an examiner’s final decision to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 
previously known as the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.165  The 
second is when the Board issues its determination.  The third is when there is 
an appeal of the Board’s decision to the Federal Circuit.  The fourth is when the 
Federal Circuit issues a decision on the appeal.  The fifth is when a party 
petitions for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court.  The sixth would be 
when the Supreme Court grants the petition of certiorari. 
Only the first and second of these scenarios would be applicable to the stay 
proposal, as these are the only two events still within the administrative universe 
of the patent office.  The remaining scenarios occur in the realm of black-robed 
judges. 
The seismic fault of waiting until an appeal is made to the Board or when 
the Board issues its decision is delay.  The objective of the stay is not to wait 
until the last possible abstract scenario to allow the patent office to issue a stay.  
If that were the objective, the answer would be simple.  The stay would be 
issued when the Board renders its decision finding invalidity.166  But this is not 
the purpose of the proposed stay.  The goals of the stay are to save the parties 
from the economic destruction of litigation costs and avoid the erosion of 
valuable judicial resources.  These goals are not satisfied by waiting to issue a 
stay until an appeal is made to the Board or until the Board issues a decision.  It 
simply allows for the waste of valuable economic resources.   
Applying these two options under the facts of Fresenius, the Board upheld 
the examiner’s final determination in March 2010.167  This decision was seven 
years after the litigation began168 and five years after the reexamination request 
was made.169  That is seven years of needless litigation that would have 
transpired if the patent office were prohibited from issuing a stay until this 
benchmark. 
                                                                                                                   
 165 Under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 7(a)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 
313 (2011), the Board’s name was changed from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences 
to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.  In order to avoid confusion in this Article with the facts of 
Fresenius, the term “Board” will be used in the remainder of this Article. 
 166 A party has six months from the examiner’s decision to seek an appeal with the Board.  37 
C.F.R. § 1.134. 
 167 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1335. 
 168 Id. at 1332. 
 169 Id. at 1334. 
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Judged by the events which had occurred in in the courts, by March 2010, a 
jury had rendered a verdict in Fresenius’s favor, only to have the district court 
grant Baxter’s motion for judgment as a matter of law; a jury trial on damages 
had been conducted, and Baxter was awarded damages; a permanent injunction 
was issued; the case had been appealed, argued, and a decision by the Federal 
Circuit was issued, remanding the case to the district court; and further 
proceedings had been conducted in the district court.170  Thus, two jury trials, 
post-judgment decisions, an appeal, an appellate decision, and additional post-
appeal proceedings had all occurred while the administrative process was 
proceeding in the patent office.  The economics of an administrative stay 
cannot be more evident. 
VIII.  REVOLUTION AND RESOLUTION 
The proposed scenarios, as with many hypothetical ideas, carry both 
detriments and benefits, problems and solutions.  But despite the challenges the 
scenarios present, they each are better than the status quo.  The question left 
unresolved is which potential solution is the best.  Which benchmark will provide 
the best benefits for the parties and the judiciary in terms of time and economics?  
Which benchmark will “promote the Progress of . . . [the] . . . useful Arts?”171 
The answer is not easy.  Answers to tough problems are never easy.  The 
best solution is when the PTO examiner grants the request for a reexamination. 
Admittedly, it is a difficult decision to choose between when the 
reexamination is granted and when the PTO has issued a preliminary 
determination.  At the point of the preliminary determination, the PTO has had 
the opportunity to take the time and effort to research and address the merits of 
the reexamination request.  If the PTO concludes at the initial determination 
that the claims appear valid, the parallel litigation is not interrupted.  Should the 
PTO find an issue regarding the validity of the patent, the parties and court are 
forewarned, and the PTO is given the opportunity to further investigate and 
possibly invalidate the patent. 
However, the objective of the recommendation is to find that moment of 
convergence when enough facts are available to the PTO so as to give the 
agency concern that there are issues with the patent without needlessly 
hindering any court proceedings.  The earlier option of issuing the stay when 
the reexamination is granted is the option that meets this criteria.  The goal is to 
save the parties and courts time and money.  Unfortunately, this benchmark has 
                                                                                                                   
 170 Id. at 1332–33. 
 171 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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the flaw that the patent owner is prohibited from filing a response to the 
reexamination request.172   
Given the one-sided nature of the decision, would it be wise for the courts 
to be leery of the PTO’s decision when a reexamination request is granted?  The 
answer is yes.  However, the standard in order to obtain the grant of a 
reexamination request is of such significance that the logic of obtaining a stay at 
this point in the administrative process should not be ignored.  The request may 
only be granted if the examiner believes that there is “a substantial new question 
of patentability.”173  Given this high standard which must be met and the 
objective of saving the parties and the judiciary time and resources, the stay 
should be automatically issued when a request for reexamination is granted.   
IX.  WILL THE COURTS WHISTLE THE PROPOSAL FOR PASSING FORWARD?174 
Can a proposal that is so simple and so logical be unconstitutional?  When 
attorneys wearing $2,500 suits and $30,000 watches, who make a fortune in 
patent litigation disputes, face a significant income loss from such a stay, these 
advocates of justice will attack this proposal like a group of rabid skunks.  
Therefore, undoubtedly, the suggestions of this Article will eventually come 
under constitutional attack.  And yet, despite whatever constitutional arguments 
may be raised, the proposal survives such scrutiny. 
At least one commentator has questioned whether administrative agencies, 
such as the PTO, have frustrated the founding fathers’ “intricate system” of 
checks and balances between the three branches of government.175  Specifically, 
the balance between Congress and the courts.  His concern centers on the 
quasi-legislative role of rulemaking and the quasi-judicial function of 
adjudication.176  The Supreme Court “has reasoned that the judiciary’s 
independence from the political branches must be ‘jealously guarded,’ even at 
great expense.”177  However, the Court has also recognized that Congress, 
                                                                                                                   
 172 37 C.F.R. § 1.530(a). 
 173 35 U.S.C. § 304; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.510(b)(1). 
 174 Passing forward is also known as passe avant.  IFV Inc., Glossary, CLASSICALFENCING.COM, 
http://www.classicalfencing.com/glossary.php#p (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).  The act of passing 
forward involves placing the rear foot in front of the forward foot and then vice versa—essentially it 
is a forward step. This action is illegal in sabre fencing.  Glossary of fencing, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http:// 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glossary_of_fencing (last modified Apr. 30, 2015, 8:32pm).  
 175 Benjamin J. Christoff, Blurring the Boundaries: How the Additional Grounds for Post-Grant Review in 
the America Invents Act Raise Issues with Separation of Powers and the Administrative Procedure Act, 39 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 111, 114 (2013). 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982)). 
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under Article I, the article we do not mind offending,178 has to be able to utilize 
its constitutional authority, including “delegating the judicial power to non-
Article III tribunals.”179 
The Supreme Court is seen as having created two diverse analyses.180  In the 
first, the Court nullifies the delegation of judicial authority under Article III, the 
article which cannot be offended,181 pursuant to “a strict, formalistic 
approach.”182  The approach “rigidly preserves the separation of powers and 
permits Congress to delegate the judicial authority only in a few limited 
circumstances.”183  The second, alternative approach, upholds the “delegation 
as amenable to the Constitution and promotion of government efficiency.”184  
This analysis examines the function of the delegation, focusing “on whether the 
core of Article III power has been displaced.”185 
The morning coat, top hat, and high tea formalistic approach is 
memorialized in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.186  In 
Northern Pipeline, the Court examined Congress’s creation of the bankruptcy 
courts, whose functions were to be adjudicates “to the federal district courts in 
the area of bankruptcy.”187  Congress provided the bankruptcy courts the 
authority to have subject matter jurisdiction over “all civil proceedings arising 
under title 11.”188  Not only did the bankruptcy courts have the authority to 
conduct jury trials, their “judgments were subject to review by Article III courts 
under the deferential clearly erroneous standard.”189 
Decreeing loudly that “the independence of the Judiciary [must] be jealously 
guarded,”190 the Supreme Court held that Congress may delegate the judicial 
powers of Article III in only three narrow situations.191  The Court ultimately 
found the narrow exceptions inapplicable to the bankruptcy courts,192 thus 
                                                                                                                   
 178 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 179 Christoff, supra note 175, at 114. 
 180 Id. 
 181 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 182 Christoff, supra note 175, at 114–15. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 186 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
 187 Christoff, supra note 175, at 115. 
 188 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1471(c) (1976 ed., Supp. IV)). 
 189 Id. 
 190 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 60. 
 191 Id. at 62–67 (identifying the three exceptions as “territorial courts,” “martial courts,” and 
“legislative courts and administrative agencies . . . to adjudicate cases involving ‘public rights’ ”). 
 192 Id. at 71. 
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finding the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 unconstitutional for offending Article III,193 
which as everyone now knows cannot and will not be offended.194 
With respect to patents, the most relevant of the three exceptions is the one 
concerning public rights.195  While academia, not surprisingly, has engaged in 
the Socratic mental gymnastics of determining whether patent rights are public 
or private, simply put: 
Private rights are those involving liability of one to another; 
public rights are those arising “between the government and 
others.”  An example of a public right is the right under an 
agency’s complex regulatory scheme to compensation in 
exchange for disclosing information on a new insecticide.  An 
example of a private right is the ownership of land.196 
The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, according to the commentator, 
may be “at odds over the nature of the patent right.”197  Appearing to designate 
patent rights as private, the Supreme Court has stated that a patent is “the 
property of the patentee . . . [and] is entitled to the same legal protection as 
other property.”198  Thus, the patent has a presumption of validity that must be 
litigated only before an Article III court.199  In contrast, the commentator 
observes that the Federal Circuit “has repeatedly indicated that the patent right 
is a public right by virtue of the fact that it is the government that issues the 
patent.”200  The Federal Circuit has upheld “the PTO’s ability to reclaim post-
issuance jurisdiction in order to reexamine patents issued by mistake.”201  As if 
the Constitution were a Halloween pumpkin, the Federal Circuit can arguably 
be said to have carved out an exception to Article III, allowing the PTO to 
rectify its mistakes made during the patent prosecution.202  The Supreme Court 
has yet to address this issue.203  
The propriety of review by the PTO hinges on this private-public 
dichotomy: 
                                                                                                                   
 193 Id. at 76. 
 194 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 195 Christoff, supra note 175, at 116. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. (citing McCormick Harvesting, 169 U.S. at 609). 
 199 Christoff, supra note 175, at 116. 
 200 Id. (citing Patlex, 758 F.2d at 604). 
 201 Id. (citing Patlex, 758 F.2d 606–07). 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id.   
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If patent rights are essentially private, then a strong argument can 
be made that jurisdiction over factual issues concerning patent 
validity that arise after issuance—in addition to legal issues—
should be reserved to the constitutional courts rather than an 
agency.  Conversely, if patent rights are public, then the post–
issuance question of patent validity may rightly be resolved by the 
PTO, which administers the public right.204 
The commentator concludes: 
the Supreme Court’s formalistic approach to Article III questions 
ardently protects the authority of federal courts and looks with 
skepticism on any displacement of its power.  It names three 
narrow exceptions in which Congress may delegate adjudicative 
jurisdiction under its Article I legislative power.  Like Article III 
jurisprudence generally, the public rights exception is unclear with 
respect to patent rights.  Under the formalistic approach, the Supreme 
Court is likely to strike down a congressional delegation of the judicial power 
to a non-Article III tribunal.205 
Further, under the Supreme Court’s functional approach, the Court 
examines whether Congress has merged governmental powers in such a way 
that the core of the judiciary’s function “has been usurped and placed in the 
hands of another branch.”206  The approach focuses on substance “rather than 
doctrinaire reliance on formal categories.”207  The Court has listed several 
factors that are to be considered when analyzing whether Congress has 
threatened the integrity of the judiciary.208  These factors include: (1) the extent 
the “essential attributes of judicial power are reserved to Article III courts”; (2) 
the extent “the non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and 
powers normally vested only in Article III courts”; (3) “the origins and 
importance of the right to be adjudicated”; and (4) the reasons Congress 
departed from Article III’s requirements.209 
                                                                                                                   
 204 Id. at 117 n.53. 
 205 Id. at 117 (emphasis added). 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 847–48 (1986)). 
 208 Id. at 118. 
 209 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The Court has found the public rights exception depends on the substance 
of the claims instead of the parties.210  Thus, the federal government does not 
need to be a party for public rights to be involved.211  Conversely, the federal 
government’s position as a party does not necessarily mean that a public right is 
involved.212  Thus, Article I permits agencies to conduct a “complex regulatory 
scheme to allocate costs and benefits among voluntary participants in the program 
without providing an Article III adjudication.”213  The Supreme Court has 
stated that where private rights are in dispute in a non-Article III forum, the 
role of the tribunal is limited to fact-finding, and any legal rulings are 
advisory.214 
Under the aforementioned commentator’s analysis, the post-grant review of 
35 U.S.C. § 324(b) should be considered the next apocalypse upon the 
Constitution.  However, his concerns are simply inapplicable to the proposed 
procedural stay in this case.  Patents are within the exclusive authority of Article 
I.  It is Congress who is responsible for designing rules and procedures 
regarding patents.  The debate of whether the patent is private or public does 
not implicate a constitutional plague upon the stay proposal. 215   
Further, Article III provides Congress with the authority to control the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts.  Under the proposal, Congress could limit a 
federal court’s authority to proceed with patent litigation cases until a parallel 
administrative proceeding is resolved.  Indeed, there is clear precedent for such 
authority.  As previously noted, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) automatically stays 
pending Article III judicial proceedings when a bankruptcy action is filed.216 
The stay is also consistent with nearly two hundred years of Supreme Court 
precedent.217   By authorizing the stay, Congress is allowing the PTO to exercise 
                                                                                                                   
 210 Id. at 119. 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. 
 213 Id. (emphasis in original, internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 214 Id. 
 215 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146–47, 152 
 216 See supra Part VII and accompanying text. 
 217 Grant, 31 U.S. at 242: 
 If the mistake should be committed in the department of state, no one would 
say that it ought not to be corrected.  All would admit that a new patent, 
correcting the error, and which would secure to the patentee the benefits which 
the law intended to secure, ought to be issued.  And yet the act does not in 
terms authorise [sic] a new patent, even in this case. Its emanation is not 
founded on the words of the law, but is indispensably necessary to the faithful 
execution of the solemn promise made by the United States.  Why should not 
the same step be taken for the same purpose, if the mistake has been innocently 
committed by the inventor himself? 
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its current authority to correct its errors, invalidate claims, and extinguish the 
patent, resulting in the discontinuation of pending litigation.  The administrative 
stay is nothing more than a time-out in the long, hard-fought gamesmanship 
that is patent litigation. 
The stay does not involve the private property verses public right debate.  
The stay does not threaten the integrity of the judiciary.218  The stay involves 
neither fact-finding, nor legal rulings.  The stay simply stops the judicial 
proceedings to allow the PTO to exercise its administrative duties and allow its 
administrative decisions to be judicially reviewed by Article III courts before 
any derivative judicial action continues. 
The courts are not deprived of any authority to address the validity of the 
patent.  The review is simply restricted to one forum at a time.  The proposal 
allows Article I and Article III to operate as a coordinated pair.  For these 
reasons, the stay would not offend the Constitution and the proposed 
procedure would overcome any constitutional challenge. 
X.  THE COUP DE GRÂCE219 
Sanctified with the blessings of the founding fathers, constitutionally 
protected in Article I, Congress is required to “promote the Progress 
of . . . [the] . . . useful Arts.”220  Patents are designed to reward innovation and 
improvements.221  So, it is completely logical that improvements also be offered 
and implemented in this country’s patent process.  An administrative stay to 
pending patent litigation is one such improvement.  Based upon a bankruptcy 
procedure, granting the PTO the authority to administratively stay a judicial 
proceeding to allow the agency to reexamine the validity of a patent is beneficial 
to the parties and the courts.  Should the agency determine the patent invalid, 
the parties address the dispute in one, not two forums.  More importantly, the 
limited and valuable time of the federal judiciary is not needlessly wasted on a 
patent that may ultimately be invalidated by the patent office.  Therefore, to 
improve the patent system, to prevent the needless economic annihilation of 
                                                                                                                   
 218 Christoff, supra note 175, at 118. 
 219 A coup de grâce, literally “blow of mercy,” is a killing blow intended to relieve the suffering of 
a wounded person or animal, and is, thus, irrelevant to most forms of fencing.  It is important to 
pronounce the “s” sound at the end of grâce.  Otherwise you are left saying “blow of fat.”  Coup de 
grace Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/coup%2 
0de%20grâce (last visited Apr. 9, 2015). 
 220 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 221 John Morgan & Veronica Sandoval, Pacific Northwest Perspective: The Impact of the America Invents 
Act on Nonprofit Global Health Organizations, 9 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 177, 181–82 (2014). 
28
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol22/iss2/3
2015] STOP IN THE NAME OF THE PTO!  343 
 
 
companies, to save American jobs, and to allow the “useful Arts” to 
“Progress,”222 the power to allow the PTO to issue an administrative stay 
should be anointed by Congress. 
 
                                                                                                                   
 222  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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